Supreme Court U.S. FILED

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

JOSEPH F. SPANIOL, JR. CLERK

OCTOBER TERM, 1987

IN THE

STATE OF ALABAMA,

Petitioner

V.

RONALD WEEKS,

Respondent

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA

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TABLE OF APPENDICES

App. No.	Pg. No.	Description
A	1	April 15, 1988 Supreme Court of Alabama Opinion
В	11	Pages 25-30 from the trial trans-cript



APPENDIX A

APRIL 15, 1988

THE STATE OF ALABAMA JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

OCTOBER TERM, 1987-88

86-1307 Ex parte: Ronald Weeks

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

(In re: Ronald Weeks v. State of Alabama)

ALMON, JUSTICE.

Petitioner, Ronald Weeks, was convicted of receiving stolen property and was sentenced to five years in the penitentiary. The Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed this judgment, without opinion. Weeks filed a petition for certiorari, including a motion stating the facts pursuant to A.R.A.P., Rule 39(k).

On February 28, 1985, Investigator
Lance Monley and Officer Jones of the
Baldwin County Sheriff's Department,
and Chief Joe Hall of the Daphne
Police Department, went to Ronald
Weeks's home to execute a search
warrant. During the course of the
search Monley uncovered a small amount
of marijuana and a Smith & Wesson
stainless steel .38 revolver. The
serial number had been ground off the
gun and Monley suspected that it had
been stolen.

Monley accompanied Weeks to the front of Weeks's house trailer and read the Miranda rights warning to him while Officer Jones accompanied the children in Weeks's living room.

Monley told Weeks that he was not under arrest but that he wanted to ask him some questions about the gun.

According to Monley's testimony, Weeks was willing to talk about how he acquired the gun and waived his right to remain silent and to have an attorney present during questioning.

Monley told Weeks that "[He] wanted his cooperation in this matter" and that if he confessed to his part in the burglary "He [Monley] would make it known to the district attorney."

After Monley read the Miranda card and encouraged Weeks's cooperation, Weeks explained how he had acquired the gun. He told Monley that he had not stolen it but had purchased it from a friend. He said he knew when he bought the gun that the serial number had been ground off. After this discussion Monley encouraged Weeks to make a written statement regarding the alleged burglary in

which the gun was stolen, and again promised to contact the district attorney on his behalf if Weeks could provide such information. On cross-examination the defense attorney posed the following to Officer Monley: "So, you, in essence, said that you would go ahead and give something favorable to him if he would help you ..., did you not?" Monley responded, "Yes. I told him that I would speak to the district attorney."

The issue is whether this inducement negated the voluntariness of the inculpatory statement. As this Court said in <u>Guenther v. State</u>, 282 Ala. 620, 623, 213 So.2d 679, 681 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1107 (1969):

"The true test of voluntariness of extra-judicial

confessions is whether, under all the surrounding circumstances, they have been induced by a threat or a promise, express or implied. operating to produce in the mind of the prisoner apprehension of harm or hope of favor; and if so, whether true or false, such confessions must be excluded from the consideration of the jury as having been procured by undue influence."

Citing Womack v. State, 281 Ala. 499, 205 So.2d 579 (1967).

Womack was a murder case in which the defendant was told it would "go lighter" on him if he talked. 281

Ala. at 506, 205 So.2d at 585. In reversing his conviction, this Court held that the sheriff's inducement gave the defendant a "real hope for lighter punishment" and therefore made his admission involuntary. See also,

Edwardson v. State, 255 Ala. 246, 51
So.2d 233 (1951); Kelly v. State, 72
Ala. 244 (1882); Redd v. State, 69
Ala. 255 (1881). As this Court said
in Womack:

"Any words spoken in the hearing of the prisoner which may, in their nature, generate such fear or hope render it not only proper but necessary that confessions made within a reasonable time afterwards shall be excluded, unless it is shown by clear and full proof that the confession was voluntarily made after all trace of hope or fear had been fully withdrawn or explained away and the mind of the prisoner made as free from bias and intimidation as if no attempt had ever been made to obtain such confessions."

Citing Owen v. State, 78 Ala. 425, 428 (1885). See also, Ex parte Callahan, 471 So.2d 463, 464 (Ala. 1985)

("Extrajudicial confessions are prima facie involuntary and inadmissible, and the burden is on the State to prove that the confession was made voluntarily"); Magwood v. State, 494
So.2d 124, 135 (Ala.Cr.App. 1985), aff'd 494 So.2d 154 (Ala.), cert. denied, _______, 107 S.Ct.
599, 93 L.Ed 599 (1986) ("the State must show voluntariness and Miranda predicate in order to admit it");
Malone v. State, 452 So.2d 1386, 1389
(Ala.Cr.App. 1984); Cole v. State, 443
So.2d 1386 (Ala.Cr.App. 1983).

In the present case the arresting officer admitted that he offered to "give something favorable to him if he [Weeks] would help," just prior to eliciting the inculpatory statement. Where a suspect is subjected to custodial questioning regarding

alleged criminal activity, such an express promise would necessarily engender a hope of favor in the suspect's mind. Because the statement was not voluntarily given, it should have been excluded from the consideration of the jury.

It is also apparent from the record that the State did not sustain its burden of proof of voluntariness in regard to Officer Jones or Chief Hall. The burden is on the State to show proper predicates for the admission of an extrajudicial inculpatory statement, specifically, here, a lack of coercion or inducements. It is necessary for the State to show that neither Monley, Jones, nor Hall offered any inducement or coercion in soliciting the statement. Although Monley's

admission to offering an inducement for the statement is sufficient to exclude it, the fact that the State did not offer proof that neither Hall nor Jones offered any inducement or coercion is likewise grounds for excluding it for lack of voluntariness. Because all extrajudicial confessions are prima facie involuntary, the State has the burden of proving voluntariness. Ex parte Callahan, supra; Magwood v. State, supra. Unless the trial judge's conclusion that the inculpatory statement was voluntary and admissible is supported by evidence, it will not be upheld. Malone v. State, 452 So.2d 1386 (Ala.Cr.App. 1984).

Under the authorities cited above, this judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Torbert, C. J., and Maddox, Jones, Shores, Beatty, and Adams, JJ., concur.

APPENDIX B

(Pages Twenty-five through Thirty of the Trial Transcript of this Case)

I felt like he was involved in it.

Q: What did you ask him --

MR. JONES:

Wait a minute. Excuse me.

At this point, Your Honor, I think he has indicated that some inducement was given. And I would object. I think maybe it should be taken up out of the hearing of the jury, you know, whether or not they were negated by him offering some inducement.

THE COURT:

All right. Take the jury out.

(Jury out.)

VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION

BY MR. JONES:

Q: Didn't you promise him that you would go light on him with some future crime if he gave you information; in other words, act as an informant? Didn't you promise him that?

A: I told him that if he would cooperate with his involvement in this thing -- in this burglary.

Q: What do you mean by cooperate?

A: Would confess his part in it so we could get it straight, you know, and that I would make it known to the District Attorney.

Q: You told him that?

A: Yes.

Q: So, you, in essence, said that you would go ahead and give something favorable to him if he would

help you. You made that promise, did you not?

A: Yes. I told him that I would speak to the District Attorney, yes, I did.

MR. JONES:

Your Honor, I think this is a violation of the Miranda rights, when the guy is in his home and under duress with his family and relatives being there, they are going to try to admit statements, and I don't think that should be admitted because he induced him.

But if he just blurted out
the statement without being questioned,
that's fine. But when he starts dealing on the spot like he did, I think
clearly we should be able to keep out
any statements made by the Defendant
as being induced by him and the

promises which we haven't seen anything happen on.

BY MR. JONES:

Q: Was there any further effort to bring this deal to fruition? Did you contact him about doing this?

A: I asked him to contact me.

Q: But you never contacted him?

A: No. And he never contacted

MR JONES:

me.

Okay. And I think it's inadmissible, clearly.

THE COURT:

Overrule the objection.

MR. JONES:

And we take exception.

THE COURT:

Bring the jury back in.

MR. JONES:

And we would like a continuing objection to any testimony at the scene by Mr. Weeks.

THE COURT:

All right.

(Jury in.)

CONTINUED DIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MS. MINIC:

Q: Now, after the Defendant indicated willingness to answer your questions and waived the presence of an attorney, what did you ask him, Officer Monley?

A: I asked him about the burglary that this gun was supposedly involved in. He said that he didn't take the gun; he just got the gun.

And I asked him did he buy the gun, and he said, yes, he bought the gun.

Q: Okay.

A: I asked him how much he paid for the gun, and he said he didn't remember.

Q: Okay.

A: I asked him if the gun was the same as it was when he bought it, and he said, yes.

Q: Okay.

A: And I said, "Did you examine the gun when you bought it?" He said, yes, and I said, "Was it loaded?" And he said, "No, it was unloaded."

Q: Okay.

A: And then I said, "Did you notice that the serial numbers had been ground off of it?" And he said, yes.

Q: Okay.

A: And I said, "You knew it was stolen, didn't you?" And he said, "I didn't take the gun."

He kept saying, "I didn't take the gun."

Q: Okay.

A: And I said, "Do you know who did? You were involved, weren't you?" And he said, "No. I know where I got the gun."

And that's when he implicated this other party.

Q: Did he give you the name of another individual?

A: Yes, he did.

O: What was the name?

A: Wasp, a subject from

Q: Did you ask him where this Wasp subject was?

A: Yes, I did.

Fairhope.

Q: What did he say?

A: He said he thought he was in California at this point.

Q: After you had spoken to Mr. Weeks, did you ask for his cooperation or did you tell him that you would be willing to talk to him if he changed his mind in the future?

A: Well, I told Mr. Weeks that
I would like to clear this burglary
up, and I thought he was involved in
the burglary itself, and that if he
would like to get a statement or
cooperate, that I would make his
cooperation known to the District
Attorney, because I felt like he was
going to be charged with receiving and
concealing as it stood, and possibly
later with burglary.

MR. JONES:

And I object to the narrative. If counsel wants to ask a question --

THE COURT:

All right. If you keep quiet, I will sustain the objection.

BY MS. MINIC:

Q: Did you give him your telephone number to contact you?

A: Yes, I did.

Q: Did he ever contact you?

A: No, he didn't.

Q: What did you do with the weapons which you seized in this search?

A: I turned it over to

Investigator Ernie Brown, who took it
to the State Lab of Forensic Science
for analysis.

Q: And were those guns ever returned to you?

A: Yes, they were.

Q: And did you pick them up at the lab?

A: No, I did not. I received them from Investigator Ernie Brown.

Q: What did you do with them after that?

A: I took them and locked them up in my office locker.

Q: Have they been in your care, custody, and control since that time?

A: Yes.

Q: Do they appear to be in the same condition as when you found them at the Weeks' residence?

A: Yes, they do.

Q: Did this all happen here in Baldwin County?

A: Yes, it did.

